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rights programs, including preferences, that enabled him to reach or
stay in the middle-class. Thus, affirmative action may in one sense
be self-limiting. Its very success may be partially responsible for
calls from within some quarters of the black community to limit it.
This is not, however, a simple case either of majoritarian cooption or of some victims pulling up the ladder before others have a
chance to escape. It instead reflects the importance of economic
status to self-definition in our culture. As Carter says: "The day is
gone when large numbers of black students see themselves as the
vanguard of a revolution; what students want now, and with reason,
is a piece of the action. So do I." Perhaps one effect of the civil
rights movement's success is the development of such class fissures
within the African-American community. Carter's reflections,
then, are ultimately not about affirmative action, but about what it
means to be both black and traditionally successful in a world that
still limits many blacks' chances of success. The book's importance,
in other words, lies not in its arguments, but in its ambivalences.

JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN: GREAT DISSENTER OF
THE WARREN COURT. By Tinsley E. Yarbrough.! New
York: Oxford University Press. 1992. Pp. xvi, 395. Cloth,
$29.95.
Michael E. Parrish 2

As Earl Warren and his Court moved aggressively in the late
1950s and early 1960s to eradicate racial segregation and to extend
the Bill of Rights to the states, the first Justice John Marshall
Harlan became a patron saint to Hugo Black, William 0. Douglas
and other of its more liberal, activist members. The former slave
owner from Kentucky, mocked by Justice Holmes as "my lionhearted friend," had dissented in The Civil Rights Cases,3 Plessy v.
Ferguson,4 Hurtado v. Ca/ifornia,s and Twining v. New Jersey,6 all of
which established his claim to being the jurisprudential progenitor
of those who battled to expunge racism from the Constitution and
to incorporate the Bill of Rights into the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Professor of Political Science, East Carolina University.
Professor of History, University of California, San Diego.
109 u.s. 3 (1883).
163 u.s. 537 (1896).
110 u.s. 516 (1884).
211 u.s. 78 (1908).
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The first Harlan's burgeoning reputation for liberalism did not
go unchallenged, however. Holmes' own progeny, Felix Frankfurter, often on the defensive during the early Warren years, reminded the second Justice John Marshall Harlan that his
grandfather had written for a unanimous Court in 1899 when the
Justices refused to block a Georgia school board from closing an allblack high school while continuing to operate similar institutions
for white students. 1 Whether to test his own doubts about the
Brown decision or simply to needle his junior colleague, Frankfurter
pursued the issue relentlessly for several weeks. "I submit that any
judge who thought that the Constitution, as a legal proposition, is
color blind, would at least have been able to reach the lawyer-like
result . . . in not leaving colored high school children out in the
cold," he concluded. With good reason, Harlan II remained unpersuaded by Frankfurter's analysis of Cumming and convinced that
his grandfather would have ruled against racially segregated public
schools had a later case presented that issue.s
For their part, those who placed Harlan I on a liberal pedestal
in the 1960s seldom recalled that he wrote for the majority in Adair
v. United States,9 where the Justices struck down on "freedom of
contract" grounds an act of Congress that had attempted to end the
union-busting practice of yellow-dog contracts on the nation's railroads. How the jurist who dissented in Lochner and wrote a sweeping opinion that affirmed a broad commerce power for Congress 10
could have also penned Adair has baffied legal scholars for a long
time. Harlan I, it seems, was a man of contradictions.
So, too, was his namesake and grandson, a Rhodes Scholar and
a high-priced Wall Street lawyer, who was named to the high court
by Eisenhower in 1955 and served until1971. Often bracketed with
Frankfurter and Potter Stewart as one of the Warren Court's frequent nay-sayers, Harlan II is most frequently remembered for resisting the application of the Bill of Rights to the states, rejecting
court-ordered reapportionment, opposing the Miranda warnings, 11
and backing the Nixon administration in the Pentagon Papers
Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
Frankfurter conveniently ignored Harlan I's passionate dissent in Berea College v.
Commonwealth of Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 67 (1908) where the majority, including Holmes,
sustained a state law prohibiting racial integration in private schools. "I am of opinion,"
Harlan wrote, "that in its essential parts the statute is an arbitrary invasion of the rights of
liberty and property guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment against hostile state action
and is, therefore, void."
9. 208 u.s. 161 (1908).
10. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
II. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
7.
8.
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case.l2
But Harlan II has enjoyed a major renaissance of late that
should receive yet another boost with the publication of Tinsley
Yarbrough's fine biography. This past June, when the Supreme
Court largely reaffirmed the right to abortion in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,D the five-Justice
majority rested its constitutional arguments squarely upon Harlan
II's broad conception of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause which he set forth first in dissent in Poe v. Ullman 14 and
later restated when concurring in Griswold v. Connecticut. Is How
Harlan II would have voted in Roe v. Wade 16 or Casey must remain
as shrouded in mystery as his grandfather's views on segregated
public schools, but it can be argued persuasively that by utilizing his
approach to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment in
Casey, the majority placed abortion rights on a firmer constitutional
foundation than ever before.l7
Yarbrough, whose previous books examined the judicial careers of J. Waties Waring, Hugo Black and Frank Johnson, has
written a sympathetic yet critical interpretation of the Justice most
often associated with the conservative wing of the Warren Court, a
spokesman for judicial restraint in an age of activism, a Frankfurter, some wag observed, without the mustard. Such a characterization is probably unfair to Harlan, who certainly lacked the latter's
combative personality and acerbic wit, but whose judicial impact
may prove to be more durable for those very same reasons.
Utilizing all the extant judicial papers from the period and
drawing upon extensive interviews with Harlan's former clerks and
associates, Yarbrough's study ranks among the best biographical
works covering the Warren years. Avoiding tedious chronology,
his wise selection of particular cases highlight Harlan's central values without drowning the reader in a swamp of detail. The Harlan
who emerges was a very intelligent, kindly, well-intentioned man,
but one who exhibited all the cultural and political limitations of his
social class. When he was good, as in Poe v. Ullman or Griswold, he
could be very, very good. But when he was bad, as in Flemming, Is
12. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
13. 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804-08 (1992).
14. 367 u.s. 497 (1961).
15. 381 u.s. 479 (1965).
16. 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
17. See Ronald Dworkin, "The Center Holds," The New York Review of Books, August
13, 1992, 29-33.
18. 363 U.S. 603, 617, 638 (1960). Harlan provided the fifth vote and wrote for the
majority in upholding the termination of social security benefits to an alien who had been
deported from the United States for membership in the Communist Party during the 1930s.
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he could be horrid.
Frankfurter, the immigrant lad who made good, often gave offense to allies and adversaries alike. Harlan II seldom did. He was
the very model of the American patrician-raised in genteel comfort, educated at prep schools, Princeton and Oxford, polite, well
mannered, well tailored, in short, a gentleman who appears to have
been taught from the cradle that people of his background were
destined to rule the nation's politics and legal system.
In this respect Harlan II came from a long line of patrician
judicial forbearers-Joseph Story, who agonized over the evils of
slavery, but sustained the Fugitive Slave Act; Oliver Wendell
Holmes, who relished the clash of ideas, but helped put Debs in
prison; Charles Evans Hughes, who deplored debt peonage, but
fought the economic reforms of the New Deal. The most recent
incarnation of this social type appears to have been Lewis Franklin
Powell, Jr., the courtly Virginian, who fought segregation and cast
crucial votes on abortion and affirmative action, but placed consensual homosexual relations beyond the pale of constitutionally protected liberty and dismissed statistical arguments showing gross
racial disparities in the imposition of capital punishment. t9
The patrician as jurist deplores anti-radical witch-hunts led by
the hoi polloi that threaten to undermine the efficacy of more genteel forms of repression. He defends privacy, especially when linked
to the conventional, heterosexual pleasures of his social class. He
seldom votes to disturb the existing distribution of property and
political relations. That, in a nutshell, was Harlan II, the Justice
who helped inter the Smith Act in Yates v. United States,zo but sent
Junius Scales to jail a few years later under the same statute.zt
In addition to Poe v. Ullman and Griswold, Harlan II raised
Justice Brennan's dissent branded the Jaw and the termination a bill of attainder through
which Congress sought to punish "aliens deported for conduct displeasing to the lawmakers."
Harlan argued that judicial inquiries into legislative motives were "at best a hazardous mat·
ter, and when that inquiry seeks to go behind objective manifestations it becomes a dubious
affair indeed."
19. On Powell see especially his votes in Keyes v. Denver School Dist. No. I, 413 U.S.
189 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); and McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279 (1987).
20. 354 u.s. 298 (1957).
21. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961). Harlan voted to restrict the scope of
congressional anticommunist inquiries in Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957), but
two years later eviscerated that ruling in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). He
wrote for the 5-4 majority that sustained the registration provisions of the McCarren Act and
in favor of New York's broad anticommunist loyalty oath requirement for public school
teachers. See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961) and
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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high the banner of privacy in Roth,22 a major obscenity decision of
the Warren years, and Chime/ v. Califomia,23 which narrowed the
limits of warrantless searches incident to an arrest. But he resolutely opposed the reapportionment revolution and was the lone dissenter in Flast v. Cohen,24 where the Justices modified standing
requirements and broadened the opportunities for taxpayers to contest government programs. He seldom appears to have met a monopolistic business corporation he didn't like.2s
A lawyer's lawyer, it was appropriate that Harlan filled the
seat occupied by Robert Jackson, another first-class advocate, litigator, and process-oriented jurist, whose occasional eloquence on behalf of freedom of speech and liberty was exceeded only by his belief
in conspiracies and his passion for order.26 But from the perspective of 1992 and the present Supreme Court, now packed with political lackeys and intellectual harlots, even Jackson and Harlan have
taken on the stature of devoted civil libertarians. One can only
hope and pray that the Casey five continue to read the Harlan of
Griswold and not the Harlan of Flemming.

THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT. By Robert A.
Burt.I Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1992.
Pp. 454. $29.95.
Michael Stokes Paulsen 2
I

The Constitution in Conflict is a disappointingly weak book
about a powerful and important idea in constitutional law. The
22. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
23. 395 u.s. 752 (1969).
24. 392 u.s. 83 (1968).
25. Harlan's principal clients at Root, Clark, Buckner & Howland prior to his judicial
appointments had included American Telephone and Telegraph, Western Electric, International Telephone and Telegraph, the Gillette Safety Rawr Company, American Optical and
DuPont. He represented the latter in their unsuccessful effort to maintain a dominant financial interest in General Motors, and when the Supreme Court finally sustained the government's Clayton Act complaint, he recused himself, but later denounced Justice Brennan's
opinion for its "superficial understanding of a really impressive record." The record, of
course, had been one he helped to prepare at Root, Clark.
26. Compare Jackson in West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943),
with Jackson in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), or Kunz v. New York, 340
u.s. 290 (1951).
I. Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale University.
2. Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. My thanks to
Michael Socarras, Ron Wright and Chip Lupu for their helpful comments.

